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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
To what extent corruption is caused by an ordinary citizen‟s „offer‟ rather than a 
public officer‟s „demand‟? In a strange twist of prejudice, the extortion of bribes 
practiced by civil servants („demand‟) almost totally eclipses in social researches equally 
important facet of corruption – offer of bribes by ordinary citizens. The majority of 
academic studies and corruption indices (of Transparency International, World Bank) 
assess only the misbehavior of public office holders. According to Transparency 
International's Director of Policy and Research, Dr. Robin Hodess “in all cases [of 
corruption], small and large, what matters most is that people feel that the system has let 
them down. That government in many cases has taken and abused power” (ISN Security 
Watch 2011). An implicit argument is that ordinary citizens cannot cause corruption. As 
a result, it is assumed that the key to a successful fight with corruption lies in the changes 
within the public institutions.  
However, even ideal laws and governmental policies do not guarantee order, 
because the order depends ultimately on the willingness of ordinary citizens to embrace 
good practices and integrate them into their daily behavior. To put it straightforward, 
even if a public officer respects the letter of the law, there is always a risk that the breach 
of law will emanate from the opposite direction – an officer will be offered a bribe by 
ordinary citizens. This paper seeks to fill this research gap and contribute to the academic 
debates about the causes of corruption.  
The focus of this paper is higher education corruption in a post-Soviet country 
Azerbaijan. Despite passing the Law on Combating Corruption (2004), and setting out a 
high profile Commission on Combating Corruption (2004), as well as other notable steps, 
the progress in fight with corruption is still out of reach. According to a range of reports 
and surveys (Transparency International, World Bank) Azerbaijan, fares bad in terms of 
corruption. On a Transparency International (TI) global corruption perception index in 
2010 Azerbaijan ranked 134
th
 out of 178 countries.  
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However, the exposure to corruption is not uniform along various social spheres. 
Country Corruption Assessment (2004), administered in Azerbaijan by TI,  insists that it 
is almost impossible to avoid bribe extortion in obtaining “social benefits, police 
protection, reduced or adapted military service, a court hearing, employment in the public 
sector, a land plot or the legalization of its purchase” (TI 2004, 7), while education 
services, along with religious ones, were pointed at as two spheres in which “it is possible 
to resist extortion to some degree and still obtain” these services. However, according to 
the Center for Innovations in Education (CIE) estimates, a substantial proportion (74.6%) 
of the Azerbaijani university students are paying bribes (CIE 2008). In this case, it is very 
puzzling why students still pay bribes if they, according to the TI study, can with a high 
degree of success obtain educational services without paying bribes? 
The study of bribe patterns in the higher education of Azerbaijan shows that the 
market for bribes in the universities of the country is driven more by the supply side than 
the demand of them. Specifically, the survey, conducted within the frames of the research 
shows that students of the Azerbaijani universities on average offer bribes more often 
than their educators demand bribes from them. According to the survey data, the 
preponderance of bribe offers is caused by the peculiarities of the Azerbaijani social 
climate. This climate, defined by an implicit consensus between government and 
population, posits merit as a far less important factor of education, subsequent 
employment and promotion than a person‟s „status‟, a mere social label.  
A status-driven social milieu is reflected in the willingness of students to pay 
bribes to acquire only a university diploma – an embodiment of a graduate „status‟. The 
desire to purchase a university diploma is an immediate cause that feeds bribe offer rates, 
exceeding that of a bribe demand. In its turn, a desire to pay money for a diploma is 
caused by three factors. First, by putting a diploma (rather than skills) as a central 
requirement for public employment, the government (as the largest employer in 
Azerbaijan) creates a „diploma rush‟ among the students. Second, the ineffectiveness of 
the Azerbaijani higher education in providing marketable skills leads students to offer 
bribes to get through the courses – studying these courses is viewed by the majority of 
respondents as “a waste of time”. Third, a low level of respect to officially sanctioned 
norms among the Azerbaijani students paves the way to bribe offers even in the absence 
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of a bribe demand. As a result, a delicate consensus unites the public and government in 
contributing in equal measures to making a social „status‟, embodied in diploma (not 
merit, and skills/knowledge associated with it) the corner-stone of social organization, 
while ineffective educational system seals this social consensus. The end-result is a 
milieu that invites bribe offers.   
This finding goes beyond a bureaucratic graft model, so widely supported by 
policy-making and theorizing of corruption. A recent anti-corruption campaign in 
Azerbaijan, which has witnessed layoffs of several high profile bureaucrats, is yet another 
example of looking at the fight with bribes through bureaucratic graft lenses. In a society, 
in which there is an implicit consensus between government and population to offer and 
pay for „status' rather than merit, bribing is not solely defined by ineffective 
governmental policies. It is not confined to public administration, but rather is a function 
of a broader social climate. Therefore, a broader, social climate of corruption and the 
incidence of bribe offers, closely related to this climate, should be paid proper attention in 
fighting corruption – the sphere currently dominated by bribe demand discourse both in 
academia and public policy.   
An important finding of the research, highlighting a new aspect of corruption, is a 
strong inverse correlation between an individual‟s respect to official rules and the 
frequency with which he/she offers bribes. Two pieces of evidence establish this 
correlation. Firstly, the research found that the higher a respondent‟s abidance by traffic 
rules, the lower is the incidence with which he/she offers bribes to public officials. 
Secondly, the share of the respondents rejecting „integrity‟ and „legal reprisals‟ (76.1%), 
when pondering whether to offer a bribe or not, overlaps with actual rates of bribing 
practice (around 70%) among the respondents. This finding indicates that bribing is 
closely tied to an individual‟s respect of the rule of law and the broader legality in a 
society. Further researches, studying in-depth the correlation between bribe offer rates 
and the abidance of citizens to broader set of legally sanctioned rules and regulations, 
is a productive avenue for the development of our knowledge about corruption. These 
findings emphasize the importance of studying the level of ordinary citizens‟ readiness to 
embrace corruption.    
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The discussion starts with theoretical framing of corruption. Before turning to 
empirical findings, I will lay out the nature and procedures of the survey, discussing 
methodology and sampling. The empirical discussion starts with the identification of 
actual rates of bribing in the Azerbaijani universities. The survey data identifies the rate 
of corruption as an aggregate of several overlapping indicators. My aim is to set specific 
benchmarks against which increase or decrease of bribing in the future are easy to 
quantify. Specifically, these benchmarks might give rigor to the assessment of 
government initiatives in combating corruption. The fourth section measures and 
compares the rates of bribe offer as opposed to that of bribe demand in the Azerbaijani 
universities. The aim of the section is to identify the direction of bribing: whether and to 
what extent it is students who are responsible for the initiation of bribes. The fifth section 
identifies the causes of bribe offer, initiated by students. The final section focuses on 
social stratification mechanisms and identifies the employment related problems, directly 
affecting the bribe offer choice of the Azerbaijani students. The conclusion discusses in-
depth specific policy recommendations for a more nuanced fight with corruption in the 
Azerbaijani higher education.  
 
 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF CORRUPTION 
 
There is a long-standing academic debate about the causes of corruption, defined 
in this study as the use by an officer of his/her public office for a preferential treatment of 
an individual/group in exchange for a personal gain. As Daniel Treisman argues, 
“different theories associate cross-national variation in the extent of corruption with 
particular historical and cultural traditions, levels of economic development, political 
institutions, and government policies” (Treisman 1998, 1). According to the „culturalist‟ 
perspective, the causes of the corruption should be attributed to long-standing patterns of 
interaction, elevated to a status of tradition within a given society (Kohli 1975, 32). 
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Belonging to this category is Robert Merton‟s means-ends schema (Harrison, Huntington 
2000). The second current finds the causes of corruption in the shape of political 
institutions (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). To this strand also belong researchers, attributing 
corruption to the level of economic development (Huntington 1968). And, finally the 
third current of academic thought on the causes of corruption states that “whatever the 
nature of political institutions, it is the policies actually adopted by those in power that 
determine the extent of corruption” (Treisman 1998, 8). 
The researches dedicated to the problem of the educational corruption in 
Azerbaijan, and the post-Soviet region in general, usually support one of the afore-
mentioned theoretical frameworks. Thus, as supporters of the culturalist approach, 
Temple and Petrov (2004) see the cause of corruption in Azerbaijani and Russian higher 
education in the absence of social capital, while Vartuhi Tonoyan identifies its causes in 
patterns of trust, strongly shaped by shared society-wide values (Tonoyan 2004). On the 
other hand, Hamlet Isaxanli, a proponent of institutionalist current, sees the main cause of 
corruption in the peculiarities of the system on which higher education in Azerbaijan is 
based on (Isaxanli 2005). And finally, there are those who argue that the corruption in 
higher education is actually part of broader policies of the government. This approach ties 
corruption in higher education not to poor institutions, or low salaries, but to the 
willingness of the ruling elite to keep universities under political control, while letting 
them “feed from the service” (Osipian 2007) – the application of Susan Rose-Ackerman‟s 
(1978) allocation model, in which bureaucrats use their gate-keeping functions to benefit 
from the distribution of scarce resources, to the study of higher education.  
Noting a rudimentary state of the discussion about the causes of corruption, the 
current research tries not only to contribute to the afore-mentioned academic debate by 
highlighting the causes behind a bribe offer of students within the Azerbaijani 
universities. It will also probe avenues for, previously neglected, alternative explanations. 
One such avenue is the identification of the level of willingness of a student to address 
the problem of corruption. This willingness is an important factor in assessing the level of 
support that the new anti-corruption measures might have among the student population.  
In general, depending on the results of the fieldwork, the research tries to find out 
whether the effectiveness of government‟s corruption fight demands concentration on 
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public employment policy (because it requires Diploma of a certain institution from a 
recent graduate to let him/her get desired employment). Or on the other hand, the fight 
with corruption demands also active governmental work in dissuading negative clichés of 
“group think”, if corruption in higher educational institutions depends on the appreciation 
of values directly or indirectly leading to bribe offers (culturalist view of corruption). 
Alternatively, if the cause of corruption is the lack of choice on the part of the students, 
as they are usually hard pressed for bribes, what might be the ways to free students from 
the pressure of corrupt officials and educators at the universities (policy and/or 
developmentalist vision of corruption)? In short, the research findings will support some 
of the three debating theories vis-à-vis the remaining ones, and advocate for respective 
public policy courses. 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
This publication draws on the findings of the survey of 200 current students and 
60 recent graduates held in Azerbaijan in 2010 – 2011, as well as 8 in-depth interviews 
with the graduates having at least five years of employment track record in the 
Azerbaijani job market. The research mainly focuses on bribes, as “the most widespread 
form of corruption” (Temple, Petrov 2004, 89). Specifically, the fieldwork was shaped to 
identify relative weights of bribe demand and offer, as well as specific quantitative 
measures of bribing practice and the causes of bribe offers in the Azerbaijani universities. 
The main function of in-depth interviewing was to identify the exact factors affecting a 
graduate‟s post-education employment, as well as the hierarchy of these factors in both 
getting a job and career progress.  
The main obstacle of the research was to make students speak their mind. In a 
society with rampant corruption in practice, but strong disapproval in rhetoric, it is 
difficult to obtain sincere position of the respondents, while their confession of bribing 
may lead to group pressure or even legal charges. For this reason, the research employed 
personal interviewing instead of focus group discussions, to free respondents from 
possible group pressure.  
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Also, head-on questions on corruption and its attractiveness to respondents could 
similarly cause alert and insincere or automatic responses, due to a strong formal 
disapproval of bribing in the Azerbaijani society. Under these circumstances, it is much 
more advisable to arrive at the discussion of corruption gradually, and where possible 
indirectly. Therefore, the survey questions have been fashioned in a way to invite 
answers of respondents. This was achieved through the employment of open-ended and 
semi-open questions in the questionnaire, enabling the respondent to convey 
uncomfortable ideas/experiences in a personally acceptable form.  
 
 
SAMPLING 
 
In order to obtain a representative sample of respondents, the research sampling 
reflected the relative share of students by gender, language, specialty group, year, type 
(private / public) of education. The sampling was framed according to official data of the 
State Students Admission Commission (SSAC) of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The 
academic year 2007-2008 university admissions data has been taken as a reflective of 
current students, representing roughly the same specialty breakdown as previous and 
subsequent years of admission. The academic year 2004-2005 admissions data is taken as 
a representative of the recent graduates, reflecting roughly the same specialty breakdown 
as previous and subsequent years of admission till 2007-2008, which saw the transition 
from 5-specialty group division to 4-specialty group division admissions. Also, the 
academic year 2004-2005 is the oldest year that SSAC has statistical data for.         
According to the SSAC, the number of students admitted to universities for the 
academic year 2007-2008 amounted to 25811 persons. The relative share of admission by 
the specialty groups and language of education is given in the following tables (See 
Tables 1.1 – 1.7). 
 
Table 1.1. Share of students admitted to the Azerbaijani universities for the 
academic year 2007-2008 (in percentage) 
 
Specialty 
Group Azerbaijan Language Education Russian Language Education Total for Both types of Languages 
I 25 4 30 
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II 21 4 25 
III 28 5 33 
IV 11 2 12 
Total 85 15 100 
   
 
Table 1.2. Share of students admitted to the Azerbaijani universities for the 
academic year 2004-2005 (in percentage) 
 
Specialty 
Group Azerbaijan Language Education Russian Language Education Total for Both types of Languages 
I 22 4 26 
II 19 4 23 
III 24 4 28 
IV 12 2 14 
V 8 0 8 
Total 86 14 100 
 
 
Due to the unavailability of student lists, which could be used to select students 
randomly for the survey, the questionnaires have been administered at the entrance to 
randomly selected private and public universities. The sampling units were selected 
through the application of stepwise method: every fourth student leaving the university 
gates has been approached by the interviewers. While higher education institutions in 
Azerbaijan are located mainly in Baku, Ganja and Lenkoran, the survey was conducted in 
these cities. The interviews of recent graduates were administered in public locations 
(namely, parks, squares) not associated with any background, income level, professional 
experience, social, political or any other inclinations.  
The selection of respondent graduates also followed a step method (every fourth 
interviewee, satisfying filter questions, was selected to be interviewed for the survey). In 
interviewing both students and graduates, quotas (gender, language, specialty group, etc.) 
have been followed. Non-response rate for this survey was 14% for students and 
graduates combined. The gender breakdown of the interviewed respondents has been the 
following: 49.2% female and 50.8% male. 
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Table 1.3. The breakdown of student respondents from public universities in the 1
st
 
– 4th year of their Bachelor’s studies, who have participated in the survey (in the 
number of students) 
 
Specialty 
Group 
1
st year of Bachelor‟s 
studies  
2
nd
 year of Bachelor‟s 
studies 
3
rd
 year of Bachelor‟s 
studies 
4
th
 year of Bachelor‟s 
studies 
 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
I 12 1 11 6 9 0 8 1 
II 6 1 16 4 9 1 7 3 
III 5 0 10 4 9 1 8 4 
IV 3 0 6 1 4 1 4 1 
Total 26 2 43 15 31 3 27 9 
 
Table 1.4. The breakdown of student respondents from public universities in the 5
th
 
/ 6
th
 year of their Bachelor’s studies or 1st / 2nd year of their Master’s studies, who 
have participated in the survey (in the number of students) 
 
5
th
 year of Bachelor‟s 
studies 
6
th
 year of Bachelor‟s 
studies 
1
st
 year of Master‟s 
studies 
2
nd
 year of Master‟s 
studies 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 5 2 0 0 
0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 5 0 5 2 0 0 
 
Table 1.5. The breakdown of student respondents from private universities, who 
have participated in the survey (in the number of students) 
 
 
1
st 
year of 
Bachelor’s 
studies  
2
nd
 year of 
Bachelor’s studies 
3
rd
 year of 
Bachelor’s 
studies 
4
th
 year of 
Bachelor’s 
studies 
1
st
 year of 
Master’s studies 
2
nd
 year of Master’s 
studies 
 11 
Specialty 
Group 
Azerb
aijan 
Langu
age 
Educat
ion 
Russi
an 
Lang
uage 
Educa
tion 
Azerbai
jan 
Langua
ge 
Educati
on 
Russian 
Langua
ge 
Educati
on 
Azerb
aijan 
Lang
uage 
Educa
tion 
Russi
an 
Lang
uage 
Educa
tion 
Azerb
aijan 
Lang
uage 
Educa
tion 
Russian 
Langua
ge 
Educati
on 
Azerb
aijan 
Lang
uage 
Educa
tion 
Russian 
Langua
ge 
Educati
on 
Azerbai
jan 
Langua
ge 
Educati
on 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
II 0 0 4 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
III 4 0 5 0 6 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 
IV 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 4 0 9 0 12 1 6 0 0 1 0 0 
 
Table 1.6. The breakdown of graduate respondents from public universities, who 
have participated in the survey (in the number of graduates) 
 
Year of 
graduation 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
Specialty Group 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
I 4 1 2 1 3 0 2 0 
II 1 0 2 2 4 1 1 1 
III 7 0 3 1 3 0 2 0 
IV 2 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 
V 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 
Total 15 1 8 5 12 2 7 1 
 
 
Table 1.7. The breakdown of graduate respondents from private universities, who 
have participated in the survey (in the number of graduates) 
 
Year of 
graduation 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Specialty 
Group 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
Azerbaijan 
Language 
Education 
Russian 
Language 
Education 
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
II 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
III 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
IV 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Total 2 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 
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THE DEGREE OF BRIBING IN THE AZERBAIJANI HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
Naturally, the first issue to consider in this study is whether there is a bribing in 
the Azerbaijani universities. And if there is one, what is its degree? The survey results 
show that between 61% and 70% of the respondents have been involved in bribing. This 
range is an aggregate of five overlapping figures. The first factor is an actual practice of 
bribing. Thus, 67.3% of the respondents
1
 (current students and recent graduates 
combined) indicated that they have paid a bribe to their university administrators 
/professors. The second factor is the frequency of witnessing bribe demands from 
university staff by students. Only 30.0% of the respondents have never witnessed any 
bribe demand from their educators, while the rest 70.0% experienced direct or indirect 
bribe extortion. The third factor is the willingness of the respondents to offer a bribe. 
62% of current students have reported that they are ready to offer bribes. The number of 
students empathizing with bribe offer of others (70.0%) and the rate of student bribe offer 
under the condition of a real choice to avoid bribes (61.0%) are the fourth and the fifth 
factors respectively.  
Thus, the share of empathizers, potential and actual bribers, is very close to each 
other, putting bribe involvement level of students between 61.0% and 70.0% – a level 
close to 74.6% identified by a similar CIE study (2008) among the Azerbaijani students. 
These five indicators can be taken as benchmarks to measure the success of anti-
corruption measures. These figures indicate that roughly three fourth of the students in 
Azerbaijan are engaged in bribing. In comparison, according to Heyneman et al, “on 
average, between 18 and 20 percent of the students in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Serbia and 
40 percent of the students in Moldova reported that they had used some illegal method to 
gain admission to their university” (Heyneman, Anderson, Nuraliyeva 2008, 4). 
Moreover, there are other important indicators showing the seriousness of 
corruption in the Azerbaijani universities. For the majority (51.5%) of students and recent 
                                                 
1
 Here and elsewhere “the respondents” stands for the combined result of the survey of current students and 
recent graduates. In cases that refer exclusively to the results of the survey of students or graduates alone, 
the respondent category will be explicitly named. 
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graduates corruption is the most important problem of the Azerbaijani educational system 
(see Table 2). 68.0% of the current students became socialized to bribes since secondary 
school years, while 26.5% of them faced a bribe for the first time in their university 
years. 
 
Table 2. The most important problem of the Azerbaijani educational system for the 
respondents 
 
What do you think is the most important problem of the Azerbaijani educational system? 
  
Frequency Percent 
Low salaries of professors/administrators 3 1.2 
Low quality of curricula / skills taught 36 13.8 
Corruption 134 51.5 
Low quality of relations among people at educational institutions 6 2.3 
Low quality of services (poor libraries, labs, etc.) 9 3.5 
Interference of parents into university choice of their children 3 1.2 
The lack interest in knowledge acquisition among the students 30 11.5 
There is NO system in the education in Azerbaijan 32 12.3 
No job placement services at the Azerbaijani universities 1 0.4 
Domination of theory to the detriment of the practice workshops 4 1.5 
The lack of educators in vital academic spheres 2 0.8 
Total 260 100 
 
 
Simultaneously, the survey data shows that students and educators face bribing on 
a routine basis in the Azerbaijani universities. Only 30% of the respondents reported that 
their university instructors refrain from demanding bribes from them, while 81.5% of 
students are in varying degrees engaged in bribe offering. Notably, more than third 
(35.8%) of the respondents have faced bribe demands from professors and administrators 
on a regular basis (from 10 times and more). The student offer of bribes on a regular basis 
is even higher: almost half of respondents (47.3%) pointed out that they have witnessed 
their peers to offer bribes to educators on a regular basis (from 10 times and more). 
The level of bribing (both demand and offer) in the Azerbaijani universities is 
substantial. The survey results support TI report (2004) conclusions that it is relatively 
easier to avoid bribes in the educational sphere. Specifically, 94.5% of the respondents of 
our survey indicated that they have a real choice not to give bribes to a 
professor/administrator at their respective universities. To the backdrop of this relatively 
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relaxed environment, the incidence of bribing (both demand and offer) seems very high. 
The analysis of the causes of this development might yield valuable insights into the 
nature of mechanisms to be employed in fighting higher education corruption in 
Azerbaijan. However, before discussing the causes of bribing, let‟s first identify the 
direction of it in the Azerbaijani higher education: whether it runs from students to 
educators or vice versa? 
 
 
THE DIRECTION OF BRIBING IN THE AZERBAIJANI UNIVERSITIES 
  
The survey result show that although bribing runs both „upstream‟ and 
„downstream‟ (i.e., both demand and offer of bribes are practiced widely), the rates of 
bribe offer is greater than that of bribe demand. Specifically, students on average refrain 
from initiating bribes less than professors/ administrators do, while engaging in regular 
bribing (from 10 times and more) substantially more often than educators. 
Simultaneously, the students demonstrate very mild, understanding attitude toward the 
bribing of educators – a position that creates a propitious ground for corruption.  
The offer of bribes in the Azerbaijani universities generally exceeds bribe 
demand. On average only 18.5% of the respondents altogether refrain from offering 
bribes, while the share of educators refusing to demand bribe is 30.0%. At the same time, 
an interesting point is that the share of students and recent graduates engaged in bribe 
offer on a regular basis (47.3%) is substantially greater than the percentage of educators, 
demanding bribes regularly (35.8%) (see Table 3). It shows that corrupt educators still 
have a margin to meet the expectations of students, who are ready to offer bribes. Thus, 
generally, while bribing runs both ways, the offer of it embraces greater number of 
students than does its demand. To put these figures into a comparative perspective, the 
director of the All-Russian Education Foundation, Sergey Komkov argues that the share 
of Russian students, engaged in bribe offering is 50-60%, while 30-40% of university 
instructors demand bribe regularly (Kolesnichenko, Lonskaya 2009).  
 
Table 3. The rates of bribe offer and demand experienced by the respondents (in %) 
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How often have you witnessed a professor (your fellow students) demanding (offering) a bribe 
for preferential treatment or consideration? 
Rate of bribing Bribe offer by 
students 
Bribe demand from 
professors 
Never 18.5 30.0 
Randomly (from once to 5 times) 21.9 27.3 
Occasionally (from 6 to 10 times) 12.3 6.9 
Regularly (more than 10 times) 47.3 35.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
Students are widely sympathetic of bribes. Although the measures of student 
support of bribes cannot serve as a good indicator of the direction of bribing, nevertheless 
it can provide important information to understand the willingness of students to address 
the problem of corruption. The student support of bribes is an aggregate of the actual 
bribing practice and potential (readiness) to bribe among those who have a choice to 
avoid bribes, as well as the share of those empathizing with bribe offerers. An additional 
factor is a student readiness to bribe even when perceiving bribes as a negative influence 
on one‟s education. The survey measures along these lines show a student support of 
corruption as embracing from 41.5% to 70.0% of the respondents. 
An „understanding‟ attitude of students towards bribing is explicit in a range of 
other indicators, revealed by the survey. Despite having a chance to avoid bribes, students 
nevertheless both indulge corrupt behavior of educators and offer bribes. Out of 200 
current students surveyed, 61.0% indicated having a choice to avoid bribes, but 
nevertheless having an experience of offering a bribe (see Table 4). The rate of graduates 
willing to offer a bribe, while having a choice to avoid them is very close (58.5%).  
 
Table 4. Bribing rates among current students who have a choice to avoid illegal 
educational payments (in %) 
 
  
Do you have a choice NOT 
to give bribes to a 
professor/administrator at 
your university? 
Total 
Yes No 
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Have the respondent paid a 
bribe to administrator / 
professor? 
Bribed 61.0 4.5  65.5 
Have NOT bribed 22.0  0.0  22.0 
Unclear 11.5  1.0  12.5 
Total 94.5 5.5  100.0  
 
Moreover, almost the same share of current students (62.0%) indicated that they 
potentially are willing to offer a bribe in any life circumstances. In addition, the majority 
(70.0%) of current students can understand (can empathize with) another person offering 
a bribe (see Chart 1).   
 
Chart 1. The rate of sympathy toward a bribe offer among the current students 
70.0%
29.5%
0.5%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Can empathize with
bribe offering person
CANNOT be justified
under any
circumstances
Do not know
Can you empathize with a person who offers a bribe or the initiation of a 
bribe is NOT justifiable under any circumstances for you?
 
 
Moreover, current students having a valid choice to avoid bribes (94.5%) are 
willing to offer them, despite viewing bribes as negatively affecting the quality of their 
education. The share of these students (41.5%) nears almost half of the entire pool of 
respondents in this category (See Table 5). 
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Table 5. Readiness to offer bribes among current students, who view bribes as 
negatively affecting the quality of their education (in %) 
 
Do you have a choice NOT to give bribes to a 
professor/administrator at your university? 
Generally (in all the life 
circumstances) can 
you imagine a situation 
in which you would be 
willing to offer a bribe? 
Total 
Yes No 
Yes 
Do you think 
that bribes 
have a 
negative or 
positive 
overall effect 
on your 
education? 
Positive 6.0  2.5  8.5 
Negative 41.5  22.0  63.5 
Neither positive, nor negative 1.0  1.0  2.0 
I do not know. Bribes have not been 
part of my educational experience 
10.0  10.5  20.5 
Total 58.5 36.0  94.5  
No 
Do you think 
that bribes 
have a 
negative or 
positive 
overall effect 
on your 
education? 
Positive 1.0  0.0  1.0 
Negative 2.5  1.0  3.5 
I do not know. Bribes have not been 
part of my educational experience 
0.0  1.0  1.0 
Total 3.5 2.0  5.5  
 
 
The Azerbaijani higher education is termed by both demand and offer of bribes. 
However, an offer side of bribing is stronger. To a considerable extent it is students who 
sustain graft in the Azerbaijani education system by initiating it. Students themselves 
contribute to the negative state of their educational experience, simultaneously having a 
choice to avoid aggravating the quality of their university training. Apart from immediate 
negative effects on the educational quality, an „understanding‟ attitude of students 
towards bribing may hint on a long-term policy difficulty: once the anti-corruption 
measures are enforced, there is no guarantee that a new policy will be supported by the 
students. These results also emphasize that confining fight with corruption in higher 
education to educators will yield modest results, unless commensurate work with students 
is implemented. The next section takes a discussion a step further by highlighting the 
 18 
cause behind strong support that bribe offers enjoy among the students of the Azerbaijani 
universities.  
 
 
CAUSES OF BRIBE OFFERS IN THE AZERBAIJANI UNIVERSITIES 
 
The analysis of the survey results shows that the main cause behind bribe offers in 
the higher education in Azerbaijan is the desire of students to get through the educational 
process without exerting additional effort at studying: all the students want is to attain the 
status of a graduate, embodied in a university diploma. The status of a graduate (but not 
knowledge, skills, expertise) is associated with better chances of employment and career 
progress. To put it short, all an average Azerbaijani student cares about throughout her 
university education is diploma, and its formal quality (honours or ordinary diploma). 
The desire to get through the university education and simply receive a diploma causes 
bribe offers from students even in cases when they are not pressed for bribes. Of course, a 
student might opt not to offer a bribe if she has a valid option to receive marketable 
knowledge as a result of putting efforts into studying. However, extreme ineffectiveness 
of the Azerbaijani higher education (providing unmarketable skills) deprives the student 
even this option. While the majority of the Azerbaijani students‟ attitude toward bribing 
is instrumental (they prefer to co-opt and use bribes to attain a desired aim rather than to 
oppose bribing), the end result is a wide practice of bribe offers among them. Compared 
to the share of cynical respondents, the proportion of interviewees guided by integrity 
(22.7%) and law abidance (1.2%) is insignificant. A low profile of legality among them is 
a function of a commensurate level of respect to officially sanctioned norms among the 
Azerbaijani students – the factor that paves the way to bribe offers even in the absence of 
a bribe demand. 
A head-on open-ended question to recent graduates, who reported to offer a bribe 
to educators, about the reasons for opting to bribe, has revealed that the willingness to get 
through the educational process without exerting additional effort is the fundamental 
driver of bribe offers. Almost half of the recent graduates (44.5%) pointed out that the 
main reason of their bribe offer was their willingness to avoid the “boredom” and 
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difficulty of university courses (see Table 6). A sizable portion of the remaining 
respondents indicated another factor showing their unwillingness to invest extra efforts at 
their studies – a desire to save time on other, “worthier” pursuits (13.3%). These results 
indicate a relatively modest role that clichés and factors of “group think” play in causing 
bribe offers at the Azerbaijani universities – a factor that embraces, according to the 
survey, only 4.4% of bribe offering students.   
 
Table 6. The reasons behind recent graduates’ bribe offers (in %) 
 
What was your reason for bribing your professor/administrator? 
Reasons Percent 
To get better grades / honor degree  17.8 
The subject had no direct relation to my specialty or was not adequate to the demands of 
current job market. Did not want to exert an effort to study it. Instead used my time on more 
useful pursuits. 
13.3 
Lack of alternatives - no choice but to bribe. I was forced / given inadequate training by the 
professor to be able to pass the exam. 
11.1 
Everybody bribed - I followed suit 4.4 
To be able not to attend the university (because I had a job) 8.9 
The course was boring / difficult to study 44.5 
 
The conclusion seems startling: if a student enters the university, why she should 
not consider putting enough effort to study, even if the courses are boring or difficult? Is 
knowledge provided by the university through courses not the main aim of the student? 
According to survey results, it is not. An absolute majority (63.8%) of the Azerbaijani 
students decide to obtain higher education because of the status that being a „graduate‟ 
entails for their job opportunities (see Table 7). The respondents point to the acquisition 
of status as the most important reason behind their decision to get higher education. 
Moreover, 17.8% of the recent graduates pointed out that they pay bribes solely to obtain 
a better academic record, reflected in their Diplomas (see Table 5). 
 
Table 7. The reasons behind the respondents’ decision to have university training  
 
What is the most important reason that prompted you to seek higher education? 
Reasons for applying to university Frequency Percent 
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The status of a graduate gives a wider chance to get a better-paid 
job and have better career perspectives 
166 63.8   
University develops the knowledge and worldview of students 24 9.2   
Family's insistence 22 8.5   
Because of my inner personal values (to realize my plans, contribute 
to the well-being of the society) 
22 8.5   
Keep up with other people 18 6.9   
To demonstrate my talents to other people 3 1.2   
To avoid serving at army 3 1.2   
To be part of intelligentsia 2 0.8   
 
The „status‟ of a graduate as the main aim of the Azerbaijani students is 
corroborated by a strong willingness of the current students to keep attending totally 
ineffective universities simply to get a diploma. The ineffectiveness of the Azerbaijani 
higher education in providing an adequate training has been noted in a range of studies 
(Temple, Petrov 2004, 89; Isaxanli, 2005). A substantial portion (63.3%) of recent 
graduates surveyed in the frames of this study, reported that their education was 
ineffective in preparing them for the Azerbaijani job market (see Chart 2). Almost half of 
the recent graduates (51.7%) do not even use their university skills in meeting their day-
to-day job responsibilities. Among the skills used most widely in their job, they 
mentioned the skills not associated with any particular specialty (basic computer skills, 
foreign language translation skills) (See Chart 3). Only 5 out every 60 of recent graduates 
report of getting narrow professional skills to perform better on their current job. Thus, 
all that the majority of the Azerbaijani graduates, according to the survey, usually use in 
carrying out their job responsibilities is general knowledge, not tied to any narrow field 
or expertise. 
 
Chart 2. The effectiveness of the university training in helping recent graduates to 
attain a job after graduation  
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Chart 3. University curriculum skills, used by the recent Azerbaijani graduates to meet 
their job responsibilities 
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Various information learnt by heart
(definitions of terms, codes, rules)
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translation
Narrow specialty-specific skills,
gained from practical workshops
Bribe offer skills
 What specific skills gained from the university curriculum, do the recent graduates 
from the Azerbaijani universities use in meeting their job responsibilities?
 
 
However, under the circumstances of ineffective education, 94.3% of the current 
students (who perceive their education ineffective), have nevertheless reported an 
intention to continue their education (see Table 8). The choice of sticking to the 
university that does not provide an adequate training can seem strange and irrational at 
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first. However, a seemingly irrational development becomes perfectly explicable in terms 
of the acquisition of the „status‟ of a graduate. Specifically, asked about the reason for 
choosing to attend a university that provides an inadequate training, a substantial 
proportion (87.8%) of the current students, reported a desire to get through the 
educational process and attain a diploma as an end result of it (see Table 9). The survey 
results show that the student behavior, including the choice to offer bribes, is termed by 
their desire to get a „status‟ of a graduate. The students who attend universities only to 
attain a diploma demonstrate a considerable level of bribe offer rates (see Table 10). 
The experts and investigators of higher education in Russian Federation have also 
pointed to the university attendance for the sake of diploma as a critical factor feeding 
bribes at the universities. Elena Pakhomova of the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion 
argues that students majoring in economics are inclined to offer bribes more than students 
of other majors, because “economics is a field that is chosen often by students without a 
clear professional orientation. For students who need simply a diploma,
2
 no matter what 
specialty it is from, an economics department fits best” (Kolesnichenko, Lonskaya 2009).  
Another factor that relates bribes and a diploma-driven education in Russian 
Federation is the level of universities. According to Sergey Komkov, the bribes are most 
widespread in the low quality universities of the “second tier”. A student of Moscow 
Technical University of Communications and IT (MTUCIT), Yelena Y. insists that in 
these universities “students pass exams only thanks to bribes. Only the brightest do not 
pay, but they usually transfer to other universities, because the education level here [at 
the MTUCIT] is very low, diploma-driven
3” (Kolesnichenko, Lonskaya 2009). Yevgeny 
Bunimovich, the chairman of education committee at Moscow City legislature, also 
connects bribing with a diploma seeking. He argues that a major cause of bribes is that 
"… many Russian students need graduation certificates just for the sake of a mere 
formality" (SRAS 2008). 
  
 
Table 8. Current students’ attitude toward their university education, which they 
perceive inadequate in preparing them for the job market. 
                                                 
2
 Emphasis is mine. 
3
 Emphasis is mine. 
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If you perceive the education to be inadequate, what do you plan to do? 
  Frequency Percent 
Change the university 4 4.6 
Drop the university /NOT study at all 1 1.1 
Continue to study 82 94.3 
 
Table 9. Current students’ reasons for attending the university which does not provide 
them with adequate training to meet the job requirements on their chosen career path 
 
Please explain why you choose to continue your education at the university, which does not provide 
an adequate training? 
Reason Frequency Percent 
I study only to get a university Diploma 72 87.8 
Parents/public opinion forbid me to change the university 3 3.7 
To get more knowledge about life in general 1 1.2 
I do not loose hope that my education will become better the next year 
next year 
4 4.9 
Psychological attachment to this particular university 2 2.4 
 
Table 10. The bribing rates among the current students, studying only to get a Diploma 
(number of respondents)  
 
Do you have a choice NOT to give bribes to a 
professor/administrator at your university? 
Have the respondent paid a 
bribe to administrator / 
professor? 
Total 
Bribed 
Have 
NOT 
bribed 
Unclear 
Yes 
Please explain why you 
choose to continue your 
education at the 
university, which does not 
provide an adequate 
training? 
I study only to get a Diploma 55 7 3 65 
Parents/public opinion forbid 
me to change the university 
3 0 0 3 
I do not loose hope that my 
education will become better 
the next year 
1 0 1 2 
Psychological attachment to 
this particular university 
0 1 1 2 
Total 59 8 5 72 
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No 
Please explain why you 
choose to continue your 
education at the 
university, which does not 
provide an adequate 
training? 
I study only to get a Diploma 5 0 2 7 
To get more knowledge about 
life in general 
1 0 0 1 
I do not loose hope that my 
education will become better 
the next year 
2 0 0 2 
Total 8 0 2 10 
 
As a result, a seemingly irrational reason of bribe offers simply because of the 
unwillingness to invest extra efforts into studies (44.5%) among the respondents seems 
explicable to the backdrop of a „status‟ driven education. The students enter universities 
not to study hard and get expertise and knowledge in a field of their choice. All they need 
is diploma. Of course, the students might have chosen to study hard rather than turn to 
bribe offers as a way to get through the educational system. However, ineffective higher 
education, not providing marketable knowledge makes the investment of efforts into 
studying an empty exercise.  
Despite all odds however, the students could have chosen not to offer bribes – 
considering that 94.5% of them have a valid choice to avoid bribes. However, a low level 
of respect to officially sanctioned rules among the students makes the rejection of bribes 
by them improbable. Firstly, the research data shows that there is a strong inverse 
correlation between both the willingness to bribe and an actual practice of offering a 
bribe on the one hand, and the abidance to traffic rules on the other (see Tables 12-13). 
Simultaneously, the survey reveals that the rate of traffic rule abidance by the 
respondents is low, thus predicting a generally high level of bribe offers among them. 
Further researches, studying in-depth the correlation between bribe offer rates and 
the abidance of social rules among the population seem a productive avenue for the 
development of our knowledge about corruption.   
Secondly, a very important additional factor that fuels bribe offers is a very low 
level of resolution to deal with bribing that the Azerbaijani students demonstrate. 
Specifically, the attitude of the majority of the Azerbaijani students toward bribes is 
instrumental (see Table 11). 43.1% of students use bribes to secure the attainment of a 
desired outcome (like better grades, diploma) or simply do not want to exert extra efforts 
 25 
to get the desired outcome through legal means (19.2%). The students try to exploit the 
leverage that bribe offering provides rather than opposing it. The rates of bribing practice 
(around 70.0%) among the respondents perfectly overlap with the attitudes of people 
toward legality: for 22.7% of the respondents “integrity” is a decisive factor when 
pondering about bribe offers, while only 1.2% of them are concerned about “legal 
reprisals”. Apparently, the remaining 76.1% treat bribe offers as a natural part of their 
social life, without second thoughts about integrity or legality. This finding indicates that 
bribing is closely tied to an individual‟s respect of the rule of law and legality in a 
society. 
 
Table 11. The major factors affecting the respondents’ choice to offer a bribe 
 
In case, if you are NOT asked for a bribe, what is the most important factor, influencing your 
decision to bribe or refrain from offering a bribe? 
  Frequency Percent 
The attainment of the desired service/outcome for sure 112 43.1 
Integrity 59 22.7 
Do not want to exert great efforts to get the desired outcome through legal 
means 
50 19.2 
I act like everybody else: Pay attention to the practices of other people in 
relation to bribing in similar situations 
20 7.7 
Whether I have enough resources to pay a bribe or not 11 4.2 
Whether the person whom I plan to offer a bribe is easy to bribe or not 3 1.2 
I am afraid of legal consequences of my bribe offer 3 1.2 
Whether bribing develops my expertise and skills or not 2 0.8 
 
 
Table 12. Correlation between bribe offer practice and abidance of traffic rules (in 
number of cases) 
  
 
Have the respondent paid a bribe to administrator 
/ professor? 
Total Bribed Have NOT bribed Unclear 
While crossing the 
street, how often 
you wait for the 
traffic light to turn 
green? 
Never 33 10 5 48 
Seldom (no more than 20 
times per 100 crossings) 
70 10 4 84 
Randomly (from 21 to 50 
times per 100 crossings) 
42 6 3 51 
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Often (from 51 to 75 times 
per 100 crossings) 
10 5 6 21 
Regularly (more than 75 
times per 100 crossings) 
20 29 7 56 
Total 175 60 25 260 
 
Table 13. Correlation between bribe offer willingness and abidance of traffic rules (in 
number of cases) 
 
 
While crossing the street, how often you wait for the traffic light to turn green? 
Total 
Never 
Seldom (no more 
than 20 times per 
100 crossings) 
Randomly (from 
21 to 50 times per 
100 crossings) 
Often (from 51 to 
75 times per 100 
crossings) 
Regularly 
(more than 75 
times per 100 
crossings) 
Generally (in all 
the life 
circumstances) 
can you 
imagine a 
situation in 
which you 
would be 
willing to offer a 
bribe? 
Yes 26 45 32 7 8 118 
No 9 11 7 10 33 70 
It 
depends 
2 2 3 0 5 12 
Total 37 58 42 17 46 200 
 
Thus, the resulting voluntary bribe offer rates by the students is a function of their 
desire simply to get through the educational process without exerting additional effort at 
studying and attain the status of a graduate. Students study to attain a diploma, which 
embodies a graduate status. However, even under these circumstances, the students could 
still oppose bribes. Unfortunately, the social climate, dominated by a low respect to 
official rules and regulations among them paves the way to bribe offers. While students‟ 
employment prospect is in their eyes inextricably tied to the acquisition of a diploma (see 
Table 7), the discussion of the peculiarities of employment in Azerbaijan is necessary 
before any policy recommendations to fight corruption are offered.  
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BRIBE OFFERS AT THE UNIVERSITIES AS PART OF THE AZERBAIJANI EMPLOYMENT 
CONTEXT  
 
Major elements of the employment in Azerbaijan render a university diploma (or 
similarly, a graduate status) production (not knowledge, expertise) as the main function 
of the local higher education. The central role of status as an employment factor can be 
attributed to active governmental policies of employment, sometimes even running 
counter to the legislation. Contrary to the Labor Code and major employment legislation, 
the listing by the government of higher education as a major requirement for public 
employment, with a simultaneous domination of the state in the Azerbaijani employment 
market, makes the acquisition of a diploma a vital element of a job application. As a 
result, the government creates a social milieu, which is dominated by a „status‟, embodied 
in diploma, not merit, and skills/knowledge associated with it. This social environment is 
conducive to bribe offers. 
On the other hand, with employment in Azerbaijan dominated by favoritism and 
nepotistic factors, the acquisition of a „status‟ of a university graduate serves as an initial 
social filter for coveted jobs. The second employment filter (i.e., using one‟s connections 
to get a top job or promotion) is usually overcome only by those with strong social 
capital. This in turn creates among the population an illusion about a diploma as a cause 
(rather than as an initial filter) of a successful employment (while in reality, ineffective 
higher education is in itself impotent to accomplish this).  
Neither the Labor Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan (February 1999), nor the 
Law on Employment of the Republic of Azerbaijan (July 2001), or any other significant 
document regulating employment issues in the country, point to higher education, and 
specifically to a university diploma as a factor in the process of employment. Both in 
terms of compensation calculation, and wage norms the official documents do not take 
educational criteria as a factor to consider. Specifically, section 157 of the Labor Code 
reads “the standard salary shall be based on the complexity of the job, the speed required 
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[to meet job requirements], and the level of expertise of the employee” (Labor Code 
1999).  
However, a higher education is a central requirement for getting a public 
employment. Specifically, “Regulations on public service employment of the Azerbaijani 
Republic through competitive examinations” (2009) posits a university diploma as a 
qualifying requirement for the right to participate in the civil service entrance 
examinations – and thus, consequently to hold a public office. Moreover, according to the 
chairman of the State Commission on Public Employment under the President of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan (SCPEIPAR), since 2011 new regulations will make higher 
education diploma the single document required to obtain a permit for entering a public 
service employment examinations (Trend 2011).   
On the other hand, the state occupies a central position in the employment market 
in Azerbaijan. According to van Klaveren et al, “government and state-owned enterprises 
account for two-thirds (66.5%) of women‟s paid employment… [and] just over half 
(52%) of men‟s” in Azerbaijan (van Klaveren, Tijdens, Hughie-Williams, Martin 2010, 
14). Considering the fact that “the State in its various guises (many apparently private 
firms are effectively state-controlled) is the main employer of graduates in countries such 
as Azerbaijan” (Temple, Petrov 2004, 88), a higher education diploma as an employment 
barring requirement, with simultaneous extreme ineffectiveness of the universities, 
creates a propitious ground for a student to offer bribes. Future graduates rush to obtain a 
university diploma – because there is nothing else to obtain from the university. 
However, once obtained, a diploma opens up a chance to get employed with the most 
important employer in the country – the state.  
Another important employment-related factor that the Azerbaijani graduates 
experience, upon entering the job market after the graduation, is a deep seating 
favoritism, nepotism and cronyism. From local observers (Echo 2006) to the Department 
of State Investment Climate Statement (2010), there is a strong agreement across the 
board that “nepotism [is] perfectly acceptable in Azerbaijan” (BBC 2004).  
The idea that favoritism is the most important factor of getting the employment 
was repeatedly underlined by all of the in-depth interview participants of current research 
– the Azerbaijani university graduates having at least five years of employment track 
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record on the local job market. Specifically, a male interviewee from province, who 
graduated from a public university in the capital city, emphasized the preponderant share 
of low skill jobs in the Azerbaijani economy as the main cause of favoritism: “if the jobs 
can be performed by everybody [because these jobs do not require much skill], then a 
boss tends to hire from the closest circle”. An absolutely central role of protection in 
finding the job has been also emphasized by a male respondent from the capital city 
(graduate of a public university in the capital), as well as the female respondent from 
province who graduated from a public university in her local city, and by the female 
respondent from the capital city – a graduate of a private university in Baku. Thus, the 
respondents from almost every social background agree that favoritism and protection is 
the major element of getting a job in the local employment market.  
The respondents also pointed to a university diploma and bribes as respectively 
the second and third (after personal connections) most important factors of getting a job. 
Interestingly, the respondents mentioned a strong role of diploma in both public and 
business employment, while bribes were mostly attributed to public service employment. 
To the backdrop of the preponderant role of favoritism, the interviewees were asked 
about the reason that drives a person having protection to acquire additionally a 
university diploma. The male respondent from the capital city (a graduate of a public 
university) mentioned that diploma serves as a requirement for entering the competition 
for a job: “diploma is like a pass when you are trying to enter the front-door. However, 
once you are in the „building‟ [of a public institution], it is the protection that takes you 
up through stairs”. The female respondent from province who graduated from a public 
university in her local city echoed this position: “I can confidently use my connections to 
help, say, my sibling with getting a job only when she has a diploma. If there is no 
diploma, it seriously weakens the impact of my connections.” Again, the idea that a 
diploma serves as an initial filter, which subsequently (after getting a job) enables a 
person to apply her protection, was underlined by all of the respondents across the board. 
All of the mentioned developments can be neatly explained by Robert K. 
Merton‟s means-ends schema (Harrison, Huntington 2000, 116–17). Merton argues that 
any given society is based on culturally endorsed and sanctioned objectives and approved 
means of their achievement. At the same time, “social systems also press many who have 
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little access to the opportunity structure… to seek the dominant goals… Many 
achievement markets are inherently organized so as to create a large gap between demand 
(goals and values) and supply (means)” (Harrison, Huntington 2000, 117). In Azerbaijan, 
an organizing element of the employment market is nepotistic capabilities of a job 
applicant, while diploma apparently serves a function of the first (entrance level) filter.  
To the backdrop of the afore-mentioned factors, the acquisition of a university 
diploma (not knowledge, expertise or skills associated with the higher education) 
becomes a vital element of social stratification. On the first stage, an average Azerbaijani 
citizen goes to university to attain a „status‟ of a graduate and a diploma as a proof of this 
„status‟. This stage is usually passed by students having intellectual capabilities as well as 
those having nepotistic potential. Graduate „status‟ serves as an initial social filter to sift 
those fit for „good jobs‟. While a university diploma is an employment barring 
requirement, those who hold a graduate status can get employed. On the second stage, 
however it is status holding graduates with strong social capital who usually get 
promoted and make good careers by employing nepotistic capital. Ultimately, a better 
career is attained through informal connections. But to employ connections effectively, 
one has to pass the first social filter, i.e. have a formal diploma. It is assumed that person 
with enough nepotistic potential can successfully pass an initial (diploma level) filter as 
opposed to the person without strong social capital.    
Those graduates that do not have strong social capital (connections), while also 
lacking marketable skills as graduates of ineffective universities, have considerable 
difficulties with good employment and promotion. However, „success stories‟ projected 
by nepotistic applicants create strong stereotypes among the rest of the population. While 
the public witnesses only university graduates getting the coveted jobs (and is usually 
unaware of the real causes of a successful career), a strong stereotype fuses higher 
education with highly prestigious jobs in a cause-and-effect relationship. It is this 
phenomenon that explains otherwise hard to interpret survey data: the decision of the 
majority (82.3%) of the Azerbaijani students to get higher education is formed under the 
influence of stereotypes and direct pressure from the immediate social surrounding (see 
Table 14). As a result, the majority of the surveyed students and recent graduates 
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predictably have not done any research when choosing a specialty to major at the 
university (see Table 15). 
  
Table 14. The major factors affecting the respondents’ choice to apply to the university 
 
What is the most important reason that prompted you to seek higher education? 
 Frequency Percent 
Personal choice (based on person’s values and long-term plans) 46 17.7 
Choice made under the influence of stereotypes and direct pressure of social 
surrounding 
214 82.3 
 
Table 15. The share of respondents, who made a prior research before choosing a 
university major 
 
Before starting to prepare for admission exams in your group of specialties, had you done any 
preliminary research about the specialty of your choice? 
  
Frequency Percent 
Yes, I made a thorough investigation 10 3.8 
I did a minor research 54 20.8 
No, I have not done any research 196 75.4 
 
 
To the backdrop of a society with weak formal institutions and lacking “rules of 
the game” this situation is predictable. Those with a nepotistic potential go to university 
to make their connections subsequently (after the graduation) work in securing an 
employment. Those without connections go to university under the influence of a 
stereotype formed by successful employment practice of the first (nepotistic) group. 
Informal social ties and nepotistic connections hold the society together to the backdrop 
of a dysfunctional state, unable to provide and enforce “rules of the game”. At the end of 
the day, the government creates an employment framework, which is dominated by a 
„status‟, embodied in a diploma, not merit. This employment environment invites bribe 
offers, initiated by students who, in their turn, have a low level of respect to official 
legally sanctioned norms and regulations.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
When it comes to the fight with corruption, it is the demand side of it that is 
usually at the limelight of both academia and policy practitioners. The majority of 
corruption-related researches (by TI, World Bank and other reputable organization) and 
the demands of policy reforms (Council of Europe) revolve around governmental 
adherence to good governance practices.
4
 Therefore, it is assumed that the key to a 
successful fight with corruption lies in the changes within the government policies. This 
research has shown that similarly important factor – the practices and attitudes of 
ordinary citizens toward corruption – is equally, if at times not more, important source, 
causing and feeding bribes.   
The importance of bribe offer rates and specifically citizens' support rate of bribes 
for the political system is emphasized by the recent (2010-11) popular revolts in the 
Middle East. An explicit refusal of a wider public to continue support officials' corruption 
was a major cause of these uprisings. Therefore, a relative balance between bribe demand 
(public servants' pressure) and bribe offer (wider public's agreement) is a variable which, 
if analyzed, might contribute to a better understanding of corruption and its impact on 
various political systems. 
The findings of the research prove that uprooting corruption in the Azerbaijani 
universities is impossible by concentrating solely on educators. In fact, the data shows 
that offer of bribes embraces broader number of students than bribe demands of 
educators. The main cause of bribe offers is the desire of students to acquire a higher 
education diploma (not knowledge, expertise, skills) without putting efforts to study 
university courses. Alternative explanations are not supported by the research data.  
„Group think‟ and peer pressure to mimicry bribing practices of immediate social 
surrounding, as a reason behind bribe offers account from 4.4% (among bribe offering 
recent graduates) to 7.7% of current students, who imitate peers when pondering about an 
offer of bribes. Nor is there a lack of choice on the part of students to avoid bribes: 94.5% 
                                                 
4
 A notable exception is the Bribe Payer Index, reflecting the „supply‟ side of corruption. However, the 
Index is confined to business sectors, and does not deal with supply of corruption in public spheres, like 
education. 
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of current students mentioned that they have a valid choice to resist effectively bribe 
demands from educators. 
The Azerbaijani social climate, characterized by an agreement between 
population and government to offer and pay for social „status‟, invites bribe offers of 
students, wishing only to attain a university diploma. Firstly, the government creates an 
employment framework, which is dominated by social „status‟, embodied in a university 
diploma, not merit, and skills/knowledge associated with it. Secondly, the higher 
education in Azerbaijan does not perform knowledge-related functions.
5
 The main 
purpose of the university education is to serve as an initial social filter for those, 
nepotistically fit for better paid jobs and professional carrier. And a perception of a 
diploma (not knowledge, expertise, skills) as an ultimate goal of university education 
emphasizes the main driving force behind the Azerbaijani education system – the 
production of a „status‟. Thirdly, students willing to attend the universities, while being 
clearly aware that these universities do not perform knowledge-related functions, do so to 
obtain a graduate status – and thus support a status-driven social organization. This 
research identified a strong inverse correlation between an individual‟s abidance to legal 
rules and the practice of (and willingness to) offer bribes (see Tables 12-13). While the 
majority of the students demonstrate low level of respect to legality and officially 
sanctioned social regulations at large, their embrace of bribe offers becomes predictable. 
By negating legality and empathizing with bribe offerers, the students implicitly agree on 
the status-driven social organization.  
This social environment, in which government and citizens implicitly agree on the 
primacy of status rather than merit as a factor of social organization, is conducive to bribe 
offers. The nature of the local achievement market, defined by „status‟ of a graduate 
rather than her skills, is the prime factor explaining the puzzle, outlined by Temple and 
Petrov (2004, 88): 
 
                                                 
5
 This in turn explains a range of unique features of higher education in Azerbaijan: a greater share of bribe 
offer in comparison to educator-driven bribe demand; a substantial influence of stereotypes in a person‟s 
choice to obtain higher education; wide support and „understanding‟ that bribing enjoys among students; 
“boredom and difficulty” of university courses as an immediate reason behind student bribe offers; and 
other similar peculiarities. 
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The fact of corruption in higher education is well known, inside and outside the 
country [Azerbaijan], by individual local students and major international 
organisations. Corruption nevertheless proceeds apace, despite the fact that what 
is being bought is regarded by many, at home and abroad, as largely worthless. 
 
In the Azerbaijani context, a bought diploma is indeed worthless from a training quality 
perspective, but not so from a „status‟ acquisition point.  
These three factors therefore must be at the center of any policy recommendations 
dealing with the uprooting of bribes in the Azerbaijani higher education. First and 
foremost, the central role of a university diploma in getting public employment should be 
reconsidered. Ideally, educational background should be altogether abolished or shrunken 
to minimum, as a requirement for public job entry – up to the point when the higher 
education attains a level of sophistication to serve as an effective criterion of merit. 
Otherwise, a crucial role of a university diploma in both hiring and promotion of public 
servants, to the backdrop of ineffective higher education, breeds bribe offers at the 
student level.  
Closely related to the first recommendation is the development of tighter bonds 
between employers and higher education institutions, as well as the stimulation of the 
raise in quality of courses offered at the universities. The extreme ineffectiveness of the 
higher education forces students to attend universities only for a diploma: they usually 
have no option to acquire marketable skills in addition to a graduation diploma. As a 
result, students offer bribes to get through the education system without investing efforts 
at studying outdated unmarketable courses. The more marketable the taught skills are, the 
lower will be the inclination of students to turn to bribes, even feeling a need simply to 
get through the educational process and only attain a diploma.  
The third recommendation is to stimulate personal integrity of students to stand 
up against bribes – both in the guise of an offer and a demand. The research data reveals 
that the majority of the respondents considers and uses bribe offer as a normal part of 
their life – they are readily willing to offer bribes without any speculation about either its 
illegality or moral drawbacks. However, the research also revealed that those students 
and recent graduates abiding by officially sanctioned norms (traffic rules) are less likely 
to offer a bribe (see Tables 12 and 13). Thus, raising the standards of rule abidance of 
an ordinary student will translate into lower rates of bribe offers among them.  
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All these three factors ultimately come together in the need to boost the share of 
high-skill jobs and stimulate knowledge-intensive sectors of economy. The structure of 
the Azerbaijani employment, dominated by low skill jobs, to a great extent is responsible 
for the weak educational standards, and an appreciation of „status‟ rather than knowledge 
of a university graduate during recruitment in both public and business sector. As the 
survey data of recent graduates shows, on average, the requirements of the employers are 
so plain that students do not even need specialized knowledge in their narrow university 
majors to get the job. Almost half of the recent graduates (51.7%) do not even use their 
university skills in meeting their day-to-day job responsibilities. Among those, who use 
their university skills, the dominant are general knowledge not associated with any 
particular specialty (basic computer skills, foreign language translation skills) (see Chart 
3). This state of the employment market dwarfs the interest in the acquisition of 
knowledge, expertise, skills through the university education. This in turn creates a drive 
to offer bribes in order to get through the primitive low-level and not marketable training, 
provided by the universities. Therefore, raising the share of high-skill jobs will ultimately 
translate into lower levels of bribe offering among the university students. High skill jobs 
will also drive the educational reformation, making it more marketable and practice-
driven, rather than a producer of a graduate „status‟.  
All of the mentioned initiatives will not only remove the root causes of bribe 
offers. More importantly, they will affect the very fabric of the Azerbaijani society.  
Ultimately, any fight with bribes “should focus on the broader political and social 
context” (Temple, Petrov 2004, 97). Bribe offers are a byproduct of a society-wide 
consensus. Wider public and government, each in its peculiar way, agree that „status‟ be 
a centerpiece of the Azerbaijani achievement market.  
The research data shows that neither „group think‟, peer pressure, nor the lack 
of choice are serious factors causing bribe offers. At the end of the day, it is an implicit 
societal consensus on the importance of „status‟ rather than merit that renders bribe offers 
an inalienable part of the Azerbaijani social fabric, to the extent that it even exceeds bribe 
demand rates. More specifically, current organization of the local “achievement market” 
is termed by the preponderance of „status‟ as a major means for the achievement of a 
socially sanctioned objective of public employment. This in turn creates a situation, in 
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which all kinds of anti-corruption legislation could endlessly provide more or less 
acceptable new avenues for invoking patronage and favoritism. Unless, the nepotism is 
made extremely unprofitable in economic terms, there will always be a temptation to 
employ it by ordinary citizens. Therefore, curbing corruption is impossible without the 
reconsideration of the existing mechanisms, regulating achievement and social 
stratification. These mechanisms need to incorporate notions of merit, marginal in 
contemporary Azerbaijani social milieu.  
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